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Abstract.  The paper examines the case in which the capital market is populated by informed and
uninformed investors.  The uninformed try to extract information from informed investors’
trades.  This opens up the possibility that if informed investors are forced to sell emerging market
securities to meet margin calls, for example, this action may be misread by the uninformed
investors as signaling low returns in emerging markets.  The paper presents a simple model in
which this type of Wall Street confusion may result in a collapse in emerging markets’ output.
* A rough version of these notes was presented at the AEA 1999 New York  Meetings, and at the Winter Camp in
International Finance, organized by the Center for International Economics (University of Maryland) and the
Faculty of Economics (Universidad de los Andes, Bogota, Colombia) in Cartagena, Colombia, January 7-11, 1999. 
I would like to acknowledge with thanks useful comments by Enrique Mendoza, Maury Obstfeld, and other seminar
participants.
1 In Calvo (1998 a) I have argued that the analysis underlying the sustainability of current
account deficits leaves much to be desired, but the topic will not be discussed because it is not
central for our purposes here.
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I.  Introduction
Prior to the Tequila crisis of 1994/5 in Mexico, balance-of-payments crises in emerging-
market economies were quickly attributed to macroeconomic mismanagement, the first and
foremost suspect always being an ‘unsustainable’ fiscal deficit.  The Mexican crisis questioned
this conventional view because the country was coming from a long stability period in which
important structural reform projects were undertaken and, on the whole, fiscal deficit had been
brought under control.  After a little while, however, the conventional wisdom started to change,
and consensus began to shift in the direction of focusing not just on the fiscal deficit, but on the
current account deficit–undoubtedly a more encompassing measure of a country’s deficit. 
Mexico showed some weaknesses in that respect, because its current account deficit was about 8
percent in 1994 and was programmed to rise to 9 percent in 1995.  This was considered
‘unsustainable’ for Mexico, given its poor growth record.1  
The new crisis paradigm had hardly begun to fly when Asia fell into disarray.  The
unsustainability flag could not easily be raised in this instance, especially for countries like Korea
and Indonesia.  It was then that, for the first time, the conventional wisdom started to pay serious
attention to what is likely to be central to all recent crises, namely, financial sector weaknesses.
Looking at the financial sector, one begins to find threads that are common to all
emerging markets.  A salient aspect was the existence of short-term debt which, in most cases,
was denominated in foreign exchange (and, thus, could not be liquidated through devaluation)
and, in several instances, a weak and poorly supervised domestic financial system.  However,
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before the pieces of the puzzle could be put together, Russia announced (in August 1998) a
surprise partial repudiation of its public debt.  Russia’s trade with most emerging markets is
insignificant (particularly with those located in Latin America), and its GDP represents a scant 1
percent of world’s output.  However, the shock wave spread all over emerging markets, and even
hit financial centers.  What happened?
The dominant theory is that–due to market incompleteness and financial
vulnerabilities–many economies around the globe, and especially emerging-market economies,
exhibit multiple equilibria.  No one has yet provided a good theory about equilibrium selection,
but multiple-equilibrium models allow to make statements like ‘upon seeing Russia default,
investors thought that other emerging-markets countries would follow suit, tried to pulled out and
drove those economies into a crisis equilibrium.’  Moreover, in a formal model exhibiting
multiple equilibria, the crisis can be made consistent with rationality (models that can be adapted
to provide that kind of explanation are, for instance, Obstfeld (1994), Calvo (1998 b), Cole and
Kehoe (1996)).
In this note I will take a different tack, and explore the underpinnings of a model in which
a key factor behind the spread of the Russian shock lies at the heart of the capital market. So I
will not shift the focus away from the financial sector, but I will explore the possibility that Wall
Street could help spread the virus.  The basic ideas have been summarized in Calvo (1998 c and
d) in an informal way.  The present note continues the analysis by providing a more formal
discussion of the central insights.
The key notion underlying the models is that knowing about emerging-market economies
involves large fixed costs relative to the size of investment projects.  Learning about an
2 The economics of margin calls or, more generally, of collaterals will not be discussed in
this paper.
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individual country is costly.  One has to learn about its economy and politics, which requires a
team of experts constantly monitoring those variables.  Economies change at a rapid pace,
especially in emerging-market economies with incipient political systems.  Thus, monitoring has
to be frequent and in depth.  However, there is no great cost differential between learning about
macro variables in the U.S. and, say, a small country like Paraguay.  In fact, a large country like
the U.S. may exhibit more stability in its macro variables, making frequent monitoring less
necessary.  Therefore, fixed learning costs may be especially relevant for small emerging-market
economies.
Fixed costs generate economies of scale and, hence, the financial industry is likely to
organize itself around clusters of specialists. This makes it plausible to assume that there exists a
set of informed and a set of uninformed investors.  The former likely leverage their portfolios
(those who know better about a given project have incentives to borrow to finance it) and, thus,
are potentially liable to margin calls.2  In fact, to all accounts, important specialists invested in
Russian debt and were subject to margin calls as its value plunged after repudiation.  Section II
starts from this observation and presents two models for explaining the behavior of the
uninformed.  In both models, the problem faced by the uninformed is that they can only observe
price and, occasionally, some details of the investment strategy followed by specialists. 
However, if they see the latter selling emerging-market securities, or, more simply, staying out of
auctions of new bonds, for example, they could not tell exactly whether it reflects negative
information about those securities or that the specialists were subject to margin calls.  Thus, they
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face a “signal extraction” problem.  The first model in Section II will show an example in which
if the volatility of emerging-markets returns is high relative to, say, margin calls, then it will be
rational to attach high probability that the signal received by the uninformed reflects conditions
in emerging markets.  The second model in Section II gets essentially the same result in terms of
a more elementary setup.  Thus, these models help to rationalize a situation in which the capital
market (the uninformed part of it) took the events surrounding the Russian shock as indication
that there were fundamental problems with emerging markets in general, and tried to pull their
funds from all of them.  The Appendix shows that these phenomena can be captured in terms of a
general equilibrium model, patterned after Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).  The main difference
with the latter is that I assume that the uninformed can observe informed investors’ trades, albeit
imprecisely.
Section III explores “multiplier” effects that magnify the initial shock.  It pursues some
ideas developed in Calvo (1998 d) according to which a sudden stop in capital inflows (provoked
by the Russian shock, for example) can wreak havoc on financial systems, unless financial
contracts are indexed to the sudden-stop state of nature (which is unlikely when the shock comes
via Russia and margin calls in Wall Street).  It will be argued that this channel may give rise to
multiple equilibria, but the relatively novel insight is that, even under equilibrium uniqueness, the
sudden-stop channel may produce multiplier effects that help to magnify the initial shock. 
Section IV concludes, and discusses possible extensions.
II.  Signal Extraction.  Two Simple Models
This section will discuss two simple models in which rational but imperfectly informed
individuals may take a signal emitted by informed investors as a good indicator of prospects in
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y s m= − . (1)
emerging markets.  The signal is imperfect and sometimes reflects conditions inherent to
informed investors–like the margin calls that reportedly took place after Russia decided to
repudiate some of its debt–and provide no information on emerging markets.  Thus, these models
show that emerging markets could be innocent victims of shocks that lie completely outside their
realm and control.  This insight is further explored in the Appendix in terms of a complete
general equilibrium framework.
Model 1.  Informed investors take an observable (for the uninformed investors) action y (e.g., buy
emerging markets bonds).  This action is motivated by a combination of the following two
variables: s and m.  Variable s is an accurate signal of returns on emerging market securities: the
larger is s, the larger is the return.  This is the variable that uninformed investors would like to
know (not y).  In turn, variable m reflects factors that are relevant only for the informed (e.g.,
margin calls, profitability of investment projects available to informed investors only, see Wang
(1994)).  For simplicity, we assume that
Uninformed individuals are able to observe y, and are assumed to know the unconditional
distribution of s and m.  Informed individuals know the exact value of the two variables.
Let and where function denotes normal distribution and,s n s~ ( , ),σ2 m n~ ( , ),0 2τ
as usual, the first argument denotes the mean and the second the variance of the associated
random variable.  These are the unconditional distributions of s and m.  Upon observing y,
however, the uninformed can compute the conditional distribution of s and m (conditional on y,
3 The model is isomorphic to that underlying the Lucas Supply Function in Lucas (1976).
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of course).  In particular, it can be shown that if m and s are stochastically independent, the







plausibility of the result can be appreciated in limiting cases.3  Thus, for example, if  is very
close to zero, the idiosyncratic variable m would be nearly a constant and, hence, it is plausible to
attribute most of the change in y to changes in s.  That is precisely what the formula implies since
in that case 2 ú0 and   ú1.  Notice that while the conditional mean of s is a function of the
observed variable y, its conditional variance is not. 
The case  ú1 is very interesting because it shows the possibility that uninformed
investors will react very strongly even though the change in y is provoked, say, by margin calls. 
Our formal results imply that one can get  ú1 even though 2 is ‘large’.  For, what is actually
required is that 2 be small relative to 2.  A characteristic of emerging-markets economies is the
relatively high volatility of variables like terms of trade (see Hausmann and Rojas-Suarez
(1996)), which will be reflected in large 2.  On the other hand, margin calls and serious liquidity
problems in Wall Street are likely to be more the exception than the rule.  Consequently, the case
for 2/ 2 large is not hard to make.  In this context, the Russian shock can be interpreted as the
outcome of a large positive shock to m, e.g., large margin calls, which resulted in a sizable cut in
observed y.
Model 2.  In contrast with previous model, we assume that s and m can take two values indicated
by xL < xH, x = s,m.  Observable variable y also takes two values yL < yH, as follows:
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This captures a situation in which the informed send a negative signal (i.e., y = yL) if either they
get negative information about the profitability of emerging-markets securities (i.e., s = sL), or
they are subject to, say, margin calls (i.e., m = mH).  Otherwise, they send a positive signal (i.e.,
y = yH).  Again, we assume that variables m and s are stochastically independent.
Hence, the set of possible events  = {(sL,mL),(sL,mH),(sH,mL),(sH,mH)}, and
where P is the probability measure on .  As a result, as P(mL) 6 1, we have P(sL/yL) 6 1. 
Therefore, again, uninformed investors are going to attach a large probability to the “bad”
outcome (i.e., s = sL) after observing y = yL if the “bad” idiosyncratic shock (i.e., mH) has low
probability.
III. Sudden Stop.  Multiplier Effect
Extensions to a dynamic setting could rationalize positive and negative shocks to
emerging markets coming from Wall Street but, unless one introduces serial correlation,  there
will be a quick reversion to the mean.  Serial correlation could be introduced through random
variables s and/or m, but this is not a satisfactory modeling strategy.  Much better would be to
obtain serial correlation from fundamental economic considerations. Moreover, if the analysis
rested there, large shocks to emerging markets would be predicated on the existence of
equivalently large Wall Street shocks.  This is possible, but more interesting would be to identify
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mechanisms that magnify Wall Street shocks.   The present section will identify ‘multiplier’
effects, and channels that might contribute to serial correlation in dynamic settings.
I have argued elsewhere that a sudden stop (i.e., a sizable and largely unanticipated stop)
in capital inflows could result in a collapse of marginal productivity of capital in emerging-
markets economies (Calvo (1998 c)).  One can formalize this situation by postulating that the
unconditional mean of s,  is decreasing function of the (relative) size of the sudden stop.  Lets ,
production in emerging-market economies be proportional to their capital stock, k, and the factor
of proportionality be given by s.  Consider Model 1 above.  Suppose that the return on projects
outside emerging-market economies is normally-distributed.  Thus, in the context of a one-period
portfolio choice model, one could write the demand for k as a function of the conditional
expectation of s only (recall that the variance of the conditional distribution for s is constant with
respect to y and ).  The higher is y or , the larger will be the demand for emerging-marketss s
securities.  More specifically,
for some differentiable function K.
The sudden-stop effect can be captured by postulating that the unconditional expectation
of s is a positive function of the difference between k and, say, its expected value from previous
period’s perspective.  Taking the latter as given, one can thus simply write
for some differentiable function .  Function  is likely to be concave as a drop in k is likely to
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have a larger impact than an equivalent rise.  
By equations (4) and (5),
The expression on the right-hand side of equation (6) is an increasing function of k.  Therefore,
the sudden-stop effect is capable of giving rise to multiplicity of equilibria.  This is possible
because, for example, a smaller k lowers the expected marginal productivity of capital (i.e.,
lowers ), which induces a lower demand for k.  But even in cases where equilibrium is unique,s
the sudden-stop component implies interesting results.  Thus, for instance, assuming (1- )K’  ’
< 1, we get, by totally differentiating expression (6) with respect to y,
The direct impact of y on k is K’  but, by (7), the impact is magnified by multiplier
1/[1-(1- )K’ ’ ] > 1.  
Interestingly, the direct impact of y on k increases with –which, by last section’s analysis
is attributed to a larger relative variance of the marginal productivity of capital–while the
multiplier is lower as  rises.  The net effect of a rise in  is ambiguous. To show it, differentiate
(7) with respect to ; thus,
The bracketed expression in the numerator of the right-hand side of expression (8) can be of
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either sign.
Modeling the Demand for Emerging Markets Securities, K.  
Calvo (1998 b) and Calvo and Mendoza (1998) show that as the capital market gets more
globalized, the response of investors to news about expected returns (as a proportion of a
country’s investment) may increase without bound.
It is worth noting that K’/K  will also be large if K is ‘small’ (one way of characterizing
emerging markets), and K’  is somewhat invariant to K (i.e., total investment in emerging
markets).  Thus, for example, this property would hold in a portfolio model in which returns are
normally distributed and the utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, because K is
linear in the rate of return (= s, in this paper’s notation) and, hence, K’  is totally invariant with
respect to K (see the Appendix).
These examples illustrate the possibility that being small in a globalized capital market
may make K’/K  large, magnifying the damage caused by a negative signal coming from the
capital market. (For further discussion, see the Appendix.)
IV.  Final Words
• The key insight of the above analysis is that under asymmetric information, rational but
imperfectly informed investors could react very strongly to signals emitted by informed
individuals.  Those signals, in turn, may be due to factors that are relevant to informed
individuals (e.g., margin calls) but that bear no relationship to fundamentals in emerging-
markets economies.  Moreover, sudden-stop effects contribute to the existence of
multiple equilibria, and may give rise to multiplier effects.  These elements help to
explain why the Russian shock so virulently spread beyond Russia and still lingers on
4 However, financial analysts seem to pay a great deal of attention to sovereign bonds
prices.
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after a long period in which it has become apparent that much of the global turmoil was
caused by problems in the capital market itself (e.g., margin calls), and little or nothing to
new problems in emerging-market economies (except Russia).  
• The paper does not discuss how the signal is emitted by the informed.  This is an
important issue that may be left for another occasion.  However, it is worth pointing out
that specialists may send a negative signal even if they do not run down their stock of
emerging-markets securities.  This is so because emerging markets exhibit current
account deficits that need financing.  Thus, absence (or diminished presence) of
specialists in the auctioning of new emerging-markets securities is likely to be noticed
and taken as a negative signal.  
• This note places special emphasis on quantity signals, while much of the traditional
finance literature has focused on price signals (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Wang
(1994)).  I feel that price signals are less relevant in emerging markets because those
markets have a relatively short life span and have exhibited sizable volatility, largely
unrelated to ‘fundamentals.’4 However, assuming that the uniformed pay attention to
price signals will not in general eliminate the effects highlighted in this paper.  Actually,
price signals could aggravate the effects on margin calls (as shown in Genotte and Leland
(1990) and, more recently, Kodres and Pritsker (1998)). 
• The paper assumes the existence of one homogeneous emerging-markets security. 
Extensions are straightforward.  A simple extension is to assume that there is a variety of
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securities, indexed by i = 1,. . .,I.  Let us assume that (1) the returns on securities are
mutually independent random variables, (2) the unconditional distribution for the return
on security i is the same for all i, and (3) there is an observable variablen s( , ),σ2
associated with each security yi = si - m.  Then, if there exists a large number of securities,
uninformed investors could closely estimate m and, in that fashion, approximately
pinpoint the value of each si.
However, the assumption of a common m shock in all the yi equations is hard to
justify in a context where there are sizable fixed information costs.  Under those
conditions, there will be few investors who are informed about all emerging markets. 
Most of them are likely to specialize on a few of them.  Thus, the polar case in which
there exists and m-type shock for each yi, e.g., yi = si - mi, where mi are mutually
stochastically independent could be a better approximation.  Clearly, increasing the
number of markets in this case yields no informational bonus.  Actually, Calvo and
Mendoza (1999) show examples where incentives to collect information declines with the
number of markets, which would worsen the forecast-error problem.
• The above models are static, while sudden-stop effects are essentially dynamic.  An
unexpected change in the demand for emerging- markets securities causes disruptions in
the financial sector because (in a richer, though straightforward, model) it brings about
unexpected changes in relative prices.  Thus, in a realistic scenario with incomplete
financial contracts (in which, for instance, the loan rate of interest is not made contingent
on variables like y), a change in relative prices may cause bankruptcy and, through that
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channel, bring about a fall in the marginal productivity of capital.  However, these effects
are likely transitory.  As firms are dismantled, new firms will spring to life.  Thus, the
initial drop in the marginal productivity of capital may be followed by a renaissance in
which marginal productivity increases over time and even overshoots its value prior to
crisis.
• A deeper analysis, of course, will have to rationalize why loan interest rates are not
indexed to observables like y.  One answer is that y may be observable but hard to verify
(Townsend (1976)).  Another is that indexation to y is likely to be a function of the
indexation rules adopted in other contracts since, for example, a given firm’s financial
difficulties likely depend on the financial situation of its clients and suppliers (through the
interenterprise-credit channel, for example)–the latter, in turn, being a function of the
adopted indexation formulas.  The complexity of the problem may be so great that one
could possibly invoke bounded-rationality considerations for market incompleteness.
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Appendix
I will show that the asymmetric-information results discussed in Section II can be
obtained in a conventional general equilibrium context in which the uninformed make their
forecasts on the basis of quantity decisions taken by the informed (extensions to the case in
which uninformed investors also look at prices are discussed later in the Appendix).
I will borrow the basic framework from Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), GS.  There are two
periods (present and future), and two assets: a safe asset (a pure bond, say) yielding  units of
future output, and a risky asset yielding r units of future output (this asset could be identified as
an “emerging-markets assets”).  Let us assume
Informed investors will be assumed to know s but no .  Thus, contrary to Section II, information
is incomplete, even for informed investors.  This is a necessary assumption in the present
context–in which, following GS, I allow for unlimited short sales–to ensure a well-defined
optimal portfolio.  Letting  and  denote the initial stock of the safe and risky assets,bi xi
respectively, held by investor i, his budget constraint satisfies:
where xi , bi , and p stand for the demand for the risky and safe assets by investor i, and the
present output price of the risky asset in terms of the safe asset, respectively.  Thus, future wealth
of individual i, Wi, satisfies:
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The utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, CARA, and thus can be
expressed as follows:
where  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
As noted, informed investors know s but not  (only its distribution).  On the other hand,
uninformed investors know the distribution of both variables, but can directly observe neither. 
Within each type, investors are identical.  Thus, I will use subindex I and U to indicate the per
capita portfolio choices of the informed and uninformed investors, respectively.
I will assume that all the random variables defined here are mutually stochastically
independent.  Under these assumptions, the informed investors’ optimal portfolio can be shown
to satisfy (see GS):
Uninformed investors are not totally in the dark about s.  They do not have a long and
stable stock market series from which they can infer something about s, but I will assume that
they can observe the actions of the informed, subject to some noise z.  Formally, I assume that the
5 GS assumes that the total supply of the risky asset is random and the uninformed cannot
observe it directly.  Our results carry over to that case with just minor formal changes.  The
present assumption, however, will help to draw a sharp distinction between quantity and price
signals.
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uninformed can observe where5~,x
 Thus, by (13) and (14),
Hence,
Moreover, if we set 2 = 2 4 2, it follows that m ~ n(0, 2).  Uninformed investors observe y and,
on that basis, infer the statistical properties of s.  This is precisely the problem solved in the first
model in Section II.  Let us denote by re random variable r after observing y.  Then, it follows
that  where, again,  = 2/( 2 + 2).  Hence, optimal portfolior n y se ~ ( ( ) , ),θ θ θτ ω+ − +1 2 2
for the uninformed satisfies:
Therefore, by (16) and (17), we get,
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Notice that, as expected, if informed and uninformed have the same information (i.e., z = 0,
2 = 0), we have  = 1, and equation (18) boils down to (13).  In all other cases, however,
signaling error, represented by z, is a factor in the portfolio decisions of the uninformed.
The model is closed by imposing equilibrium conditions.  Assuming a fixed net supply of
assets, and assuming total supply of the risky asset equals 1, we can state the general equilibrium
condition as follows:
where  is the share of informed investors in total population, and total population is set equal to
unity.  A brief look at equations (13) and (18) shows that, given s and z, equation (19) determines
p.  Moreover, p increases with s and declines with z (or m).  The impact of z depends positively
on the share of uninformed.  Thus, given the motivation behind these notes (where m plays a
prominent role), it is useful to examine the extreme case in which the informed investors are of
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which increases in absolute value as 2/ 2 declines.  Thus, we have obtained the same type of
result that we got in the first model of Section II:  misinformation has an increasingly large
impact on prices or quantities as the relative volatility of misinformation goes to zero.  Notice
that, as in the text, the relevant concept is 2/ 2, not just 2.  
In the present model we also get results about the distribution of prices, which paint a
similar picture.  Thus, by (20), the unconditional expectation of i.e., it equals (as onep s= / ,ρ
would have guessed) the expected return on the risky asset divided by the gross return on the safe
asset, while its unconditional variance is
which, once again, increases as 2 declines.  However, the existence of uninformed investors
reduces price volatility.  Notice, for instance, that if  = 1 and, thus, the uninformed investors are
nil, we have, by (13) and (19), that the unconditional variance of p would be
which is larger than the expression in (22).
Sudden Stop effects discussed in Section III are easily captured if one assumes that the
unconditional expectation of s, i.e.,  is an increasing function of p.  For instance, assumings ,









I will focus on the case in which the denominator is positive, since it (plausibly) implies a
positive association between s and equilibrium p.  Armed with this result, it is straightforward to
show, for instance, that the variance of equilibrium price becomes
Thus, the unconditional variance of p is larger, the larger is the SS effect, .  Interestingly, the SS
effect vanishes as 2/ 2 goes to zero.  This is so because for 2/ 2 small, the uninformed respond
almost exclusively to informed investors’ behavior, and tend to ignore a priori information about
s.  However, SS effects are likely to increase the variance of s, 2, a channel that is disregarded in
this analysis.
Would equilibrium change if the uninformed extracted information from prices?  The
answer is “no” in the extreme case examined earlier in which the informed are of measure zero. 
Prices would just reflect what the uninformed learn from the informed investors’ trades, and
nothing else.  The information obtained by informed investors does not get reflected in prices
because they are insignificant players.  However, if  > 0, prices will convey additional
information.  Conceivably, information contained in prices could be so good that the uninformed
will altogether stop looking at trades.  This would be the case at equilibria in which prices are
fully revealing, i.e., p reveals s (an example is shown below).  However, if prices are not fully
revealing (see, for instance, the examples discussed in GS), the uninformed investors would still
have incentives to use information about informed investors’ trades.  This implies that the effects
highlighted in this paper will still hold in the richer model.  It would, however, be interesting to
gain a deeper understanding about the interaction between price and quantity signals as the share
6 This equilibrium concept makes sense only if  > 0.  Otherwise, prices cannot convey
information about s.  When  = 0, the uninformed entirely rely on their prior information.  This
“discontinuity” at  = 0, is key to the GS examples displaying nonexistence of equilibrium when
 is endogenously determined.
7 This is an imprecise statement in a static framework like ours.  More precise would be
to say that “if investors believe that the other investors believe that equilibrium prices satisfy
equation (22), then the uninformed would have no incentive to learn about informed investors’







of the informed investors, and other parameters are varied.
It is useful to contrast the equilibrium concept developed above with the one in GS.  GS
assumes that individuals can observe market prices but not quantities.  Interestingly, under the
GS assumptions, there exists an equilibrium in which the uninformed would be able have exactly
the same information as informed investors!  To see this, let us assume that the statement holds
true.  Thus, since both types have the same utility function, the equilibrium condition in the
risky-asset market will be, recalling (13) and (19),
Therefore, in that equilibrium s would be fully revealed by prices (since s = 2 + p).6  Clearly,
as pointed out above, if the economy settles down to this equilibrium, uninformed investors will
have no incentive to learn about informed investors’ trades.7
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